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Extended Abstract
The development of IT, especially the emergence
of Internet, has influenced the purchasing behaviors of
customers in recent years. Many literatures argue that
the Internet leads to intense price competition and the
market will finally evolve into a frictionless state
because the consumers can acquire the product
information more and more easily. However, some
research results show this is not always true. For
example, Lee found that the price of used cars
auctioned in the e-market is higher than that of the
conventional market in Japan; Bailey did a research on
the products, such as books, CD and software in
Boston area and indicated that the e-market’s price is
higher. So in order to explain the influence of
information technology on consumers, we build a
search model in this paper and use the search theory to
analyze it.
Our model inherits some characteristics from
some previous search models and discusses an
important variable--search cost. The first search model,
the Hotelling Model, regarded travel costs as
consumers’ search costs and pointed out that search
cost is a source of monopolization. But it did not take
the factor of sellers, which might influence the search
cost as well, into account. Although Salop, Bakos,
Zettlemeyer, Rajav Lal improved this aspect of
Hotelling’s model, their definitions of search cost did
not differ much from Hotelling’s in essence. Different
with these models, we bring forward an inventive idea
that the search costs are divided into two parts: one is
called systematic search cost and the other is
nonsystematic search cost. Systematic search cost is
the cost of accessing a seller and negotiating the price,
which may occur in every purchase, and it is a feature
of markets. Both transportation fee and calling fee
belong to this part. Generally speaking, buying the
products in a conventional market would cost
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consumers more systematic search cost than in an
e-market. On the other hand, nonsystematic search cost
isn’t an innate feature of markets and can be controlled
by sellers. They can manipulate this part of search
costs through many ways like the products’ design,
marketing, the layout of product-selling homepages
and so on. The more the products deviate from the
normal, the higher this kind of cost is. And the
nonsystematic search cost is optional, which means
that consumers may buy a product before knowing its
exact utilities.
In this paper, we mainly discuss the equilibrium
of oligarch markets. It assumes there are two firms
selling the same kind of products in the market. The
first one is the leader and the other is the follower.
Every consumer is buying at most one item from the
two sellers and can return the dissatisfying items with
paying the return cost, which is also a feature of
market. It is supposed that there is no difference of
quality between the products of the two sellers, but
there may be some non-quality differences, such as the
appearance and the design of the products. Consumers
know the prices, the systematic search costs, and the
non-systematic search costs. However, they don’t
know the gross utilities they will derive from the
product but know the distribution pattern of the utility.
The search pattern of customers could be illustrated in
a search tree. In each stage of the search tree,
customers can choose an action from the action set
according to the expected utility of each one. On the
other hand, sellers must make the decisions of the two
variables: prices and the nonsystematic search costs.
The decision-making process is a two-stage
perfect-information game. First, the sellers must seek
the price equilibrium under certain combination of
nonsystematic search cost. Secondly, after solving the
problem of sub-game equilibrium, we can get the
nonsystematic search cost equilibrium and it comes the
equilibrium for the whole problem.

By simulation, we get the equilibriums of the
market for some special cases. And some managerial
implications derived from the simulation results are
that in a low-return-cost market, the higher systematic
search cost, such as the transportation fee and the
calling fee, may cause the followers of the market gain
less. If this kind of search cost is high, people are
relatively unwilling to search and buy the products of
the less famous producer, that is, the follower’s
products. And even after buying the follower’s
products, because the return cost is low, many
consumers would choose to return the dissatisfying
items. So in a low-return-cost market, the higher
systematic search cost is a disadvantage to the follower.
It is recommended that the followers may invest in
information technology, e.g. the Internet to make
search easier and lower the systematic search cost. By
realizing the information technology first, the follower
can put the leader into a disadvantageous circumstance.
Therefore, the leaders, on the other hand, should also

utilize the technology to consolidate their power in the
market as well. And in a high-return-cost market, the
higher systematic search cost is also a disadvantage to
the follower. The application of information
technology can also benefit the follower and the leader.
In addition, different from the low-return-cost market,
our results show that in the high-return-cost market
followers might choose to differentiate themselves to
increase the non-systematic search cost. Because of the
high nonsystematic search cost, the consumers would
buy the products directly without knowing the exact
utility of the product. Moreover, the high return cost
would keep the consumers from returning the
dissatisfying products. In this way, the followers lock
the consumers who might originally not buy the
products after knowing the exact utilities of them.
Even if the leaders build the electronic transaction
market firstly, the followers can also differentiate
themselves to set a defense state against the
competitors.

